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Abstract 
In this thesis, I study the relationship between private equity fund managers’ experience and 
fund returns. Previous private equity research has focused mainly on the performance 
persistence of fund returns and the contribution of this paper is to study the learning effect 
of private equity funds’ general partners. 
The data used in this thesis is collected from the SDC Platinum VentureXpert and the 
EurekaHedge Private Equity database. I restrict the study to US buyout and venture capital 
funds with vintages from 1980 to 2001. The VentureXpert data has an extensive coverage of 
funds in 1980’s and 1990’s whereas the EurekaHedge contains data on more recent funds. 
To investigate experience, I use the fund sequence as a proxy for the general partner’s 
experience. To investigate the performance, I study the effect of experience on the successful 
divestment rate of the portfolio companies as well as different performance measure 
multiples that are commonly used in private equity research. 
The central findings of the study imply that the managers’ experience correlates highly with 
fund returns particularly as for venture capital. The same relationship is observable for 
buyout funds, as well, but not to the same extent. I also find a negative correlation between 
the fund size and the performance as for VC funds.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Private Equity as an asset class is not among the most studied topics in the field of finance 
due to the limited access to private equity placements and restricted access to quality data. 
However, during the last three decades, private equity placements have become an 
increasingly popular option among institutional investors, high net worth individuals and 
university endowments seeking above average returns. In 2016, private equity firms 
managed assets worth over $2.49 trillion whereas the same figure in 2000 was under $600 
billion (Heberlein, 2017).  
The private nature of private equity data poses significant challenges when evaluating the 
performance of this asset class. Private equity firms are not obliged to disclose any public 
data about historical fund performances and investors often have to settle for potentially 
biased accounting valuations of their investments during their investment period (Braun et 
al. 2017). Nevertheless, the performance of private equity funds has been studied lately, but 
with varying and contradictory results. According to Kaplan and Schoar (2005), private 
equity has historically outperformed S&P 500 index gross of fees but underperformed the 
index with fees taken into account. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) report also significant 
heterogeneity among fund level returns and find evidence for superior return persistence 
among the subsequent funds of top performing firms. The related academic findings, 
however, vary substantially based both on the used methods and the used data.  A more 
recent study by Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) indicates for more negative performance 
measures as for private equity, mostly due to differing assumptions. 
Although private equity performance has been under academic scrutiny during the last 
decades, relatively little research has been concentrating on the drivers behind the returns. 
Therefore, this study focuses on further deepening our understanding of the persistence and 
evolution of performance of private equity funds. The absolute returns of funds and relative 
performance to benchmark indices are not of primary interest of this study, but it will rather 
focus on examining the explaining factors behind firm level return trends. The key aspect 
this study addresses is the learning effect of PE funds’ general partners. This study aims to 
answer two questions:  
1) Is there evidence that funds with more experienced general partners perform better? 
2) If yes, is it due to expertise, fund size or a riskier approach of the general partners? 
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The study is structured as follows: In the second section, I address previous research around 
private equity performance and factors behind return trends after which I provide the 
theoretical motivation for the study and the research hypotheses. In the third section, I 
review the datasets used in the study and address possible data bias issues along the possible 
limitations of the data. The fourth section provides the assumptions and methods based on 
which the fifth section presents the data analysis, the presentation of results and further 
discussion. Lastly, the sixth section concludes the findings and implications of the study.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1. Previous research 
Private equity reflects a vastly different investment universe compared to the public 
securities market. PE funds are typically structured through a limited partnership 
agreement of 10 to 12 years where most of the capital committed is contributed by Limited 
Partners (investors) whereas the investment decisions and overseeing responsibility of the 
portfolio companies are centralized to General Partners (managers). GP’s typically collect 
annual management fees amounting 1.5-2.5% of fund commitments and a carried interest 
of 20% of fund profits in the liquidation stage where the fund manager aims to realize the 
returns by selling the portfolio companies or through an IPO (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). 
As private equity is a broad definition for number of different investment vehicles, the 
assessment of performance drivers must be correctly evaluated to reflect the nature of each 
private equity subclass. The primary classes of private equity in this study are buyout funds 
and venture capital funds. The nature and characteristics of these two fund types differ 
considerably from each other and, therefore, they require a different approach when 
evaluating factors that affect their fund returns. Buyout funds that acquire majority stakes 
in mature, low-performing companies, require different expertise and skillsets of their fund 
manager compared to, for example, venture capital funds acquiring minority stakes in early-
stage growth companies. Albeit the differences between the two types of private equity, a 
conjunctive attribute in private equity is that the general partners aim to add value by 
steering and overseeing the portfolio company business by appointing their own personnel 
in the companies’ boards and often controlling for the executive team composition. 
Especially venture capital firms are known for using reputation and expertise as a 
competitive advantage, as the most reputable VC’s are able to acquire start-up equity at a 
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10-14% discount in exchange for superior steering expertise, large network of connections 
and for the knowledge on how to support sustainable business development and growth in 
early-stage companies (Hsu, 2004).  
As PE performance studies have previously focused on addressing the question whether 
certain PE fund managers have been able to continuously outperform their peers, I continue 
to investigate the subject from a different perspective. Studying the effect of managerial 
expertise on fund level returns is a natural continuum for the previous study of PE 
performance persistence. Previous research of e.g. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Buchner 
et al. (2016) have found strong persistence among top performing fund managers, which 
raises new questions whether this kind of performance can be achieved by a riskier 
approach, by technical fund specifications or by better investment decisions of more 
experienced general partners. This study aims to further shed light on these questions. 
To further investigate the theoretical motivation behind my hypothesis i.e. that PE fund 
managers learn to make better decisions over time, I firstly look into the persistence of PE 
performance and secondly investigate the reasons for this persistence. Performance 
persistence is an important factor when evaluating the learning effect, because without long 
term persistence, there would not be sustainable learning effect that would concretely affect 
fund performance.  
Since Kaplan and Schoar’s 2005 published seminal article on private equity performance 
and performance persistence, many others have conducted their own follow-up studies. The 
central findings in Kaplan and Schoar’s (2005) study imply that, unlike in mutual fund 
industry, general partners whose funds have outperformed in the past are likely to 
outperform in the future, as well. They record a statistically significant positive coefficient 
on firms’ successive funds’ outperformance by constructing a regression model with fund 
performance as a dependent variable and same the GP’s previous fund returns as 
explanatory variables. To put this in context, a 1% increase in the past fund performance 
(IRR) is associated with a combined 0.77% increase in successive funds. When comparing 
the performance persistence of buyout funds and venture capital funds, they find stronger 
performance persistence in venture capital funds (1% increase in the past performance is 
associated with 1.10% increase in successive funds) whereas for buyout funds, a 1% increase 
in the past performance increases successive funds’ returns by only 0.26%. Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) also record positive coefficients on the logarithms of fund size and sequence 
number, 0.09 and 0.20, respectively. This suggests that funds with more experienced 
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managers outperform funds with less experienced managers. However, they do not address 
this finding more specifically, nor do they examine the difference between venture capital 
and buyout funds. 
The drivers of this performance persistence have been further studied by Buchner et al. 
(2016) who find that the risk that managers take is an important driver of performance 
persistence both in venture capital funds and in buyout funds. They conduct the study by 
investigating deal- and fund-level cash flow data from the Center for Private Equity Research 
(CEPRES) database and they measure risk as intra-fund return volatility. To further 
investigate the composition of fund level risk, they divide the total fund return volatility to 
downside risk and upside risk. By dividing the total volatility, they investigate whether fund 
managers’ outperformance is driven by a superior ability to pick outperforming portfolio 
companies (higher upside volatility) or by a superior ability to minimize losses (lower 
downside volatility). They examine this by running a regression with the fund level IRR as a 
dependent variable and both the downside and upside volatility as explanatory variables. As 
a result, they discover that the coefficients for the downside volatility are much larger (7.3 
times for buyout and 1.5 times for VC) than those for the upside volatility, which suggests 
that fund performance is driven rather by fund managers’ ability to minimize losses than by 
their ability of selecting outperforming portfolio companies. Intuitively, selecting 
outperforming deals becomes increasingly important in venture capital universe, as most of 
the fund returns typically consist of only few successful exits. Buchner et al. (2016) 
Korteweg and Sorensen (2017) continued to study the PE performance persistence with a 
variance decomposition model to better account for long term performance. As earlier 
studies broadly focused on explaining future performance with the performance of the 
previous (or two previous) funds, Korteweg and Sorensen argue that, with the variance 
decomposition model it is possible to study the persistence effect with data that spans over 
a longer period of time thus not being limited only to data concerning only the most recent 
funds. In an attempt to correctly explain the performance persistence, Korteweg and 
Sorensen divide the total persistence to investable persistence (skill) and noise (luck), which 
they observe with signal-to-noise ratios for smaller PE subsamples. The central findings in 
their study indicate that investable persistence is hard to find, but smaller funds seem to 
have a greater long-term persistence and more investable persistence than their larger 
equivalents, especially as for venture capital. Although the volatility of smaller fund returns 
is greater than for larger funds, the signal-to-noise ratio is also higher, which implies that 
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the performance of smaller funds is a more informative signal for investors as a greater 
proportion of the performance is driven by skill rather than by luck and random variance. 
They also argue that the location of a GP has a significant effect on the noisiness of 
performance persistence. They categorized the funds to three different location subclasses 
i.e. Europe, the US and ROW, and they showed that the firms located in Europe have a 
higher signal-to-noise ratio than their US and ROW equivalents, implying that European 
GPs carry, on average, a higher investable persistence. Korteweg and Sorensen (2017) 
 
2.2. Theoretical motivation and hypotheses 
Although private equity performance is, nowadays, a widely researched topic with somewhat 
established findings on overall performance and on the persistence of these returns, it is yet 
unclear why certain fund managers outperform their peers. Unlike in mutual fund industry, 
where the data is public and available for more rigorous scrutiny, PE, as an asset class, differs 
in many ways due to the lack of objective data and its exclusivity in form of high investment 
barriers and limited access to most popular fund placements. To build on previous research 
on performance persistence, I focus on the real value of the managerial expertise and 
experience that PE fund general partners provide for limited partners who invest in these 
funds. If positive outperformance can be divided into two components, skill and luck, it is of 
great importance to study whether the skill component can be developed in the process of 
managing private equity funds. Top performing general partners are likely to be prone to 
have above average luck, but as previous studies imply, that is not the whole truth.  
In finance, practice rarely makes one perfect, but intuitively, experience should be an asset 
in every field of work. Learning the tricks of the trade regarding PE includes screening for 
potential investors, marketing new funds, finding attractive portfolio companies and 
developing their business, and ultimately exiting the investments through an IPO or by 
M&A. However, managerial expertise is hard to measure and due to the obscurity of the PE 
data, managers’ experience is difficult to measure, as well. An important assumption in this 
study is that the sequence number of a given fund is a good proxy for a general partner’s 
experience. This assumption takes into account that a part of the knowledge and experience 
is directly tied up with the management team of the fund, but a part of the knowledge can 
be attributed to the whole organization.   
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To test whether a skill can be developed to the extent where it can be claimed to have a 
positive effect on fund level returns, I test the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: A higher fund sequence number leads to higher fund returns 
If the fund sequence correctly reflects the experience of a given general partner and this 
experience affects fund returns positively, it should result in higher fund level returns 
measured with IRR, TVPI1, DPI2. A higher fund performance should also correlate with the 
successful exit rate of the portfolio investments.   
 
H2: A higher fund sequence number leads to more stable returns 
Given the volatile nature of private equity, managerial expertise could result in a lower 
downside risk when the process of screening investment opportunities becomes more 
sophisticated. If this is the case, a higher fund sequence number should lead to less 
heterogeneous returns across individual funds.  
 
3. Private Equity dataset 
As previously stated, the limited amount of reliable data on the private equity universe poses 
challenges when evaluating and benchmarking VC and buyout funds. As PE firms are not 
subject to similar information disclosure policies as their public market equivalents, most 
research have been conducted using information available from different commercial PE 
databases. These commercial databases collect information directly from PE firms and from 
LP’s (investors), which may result in biases and weaken the data credibility. Potential biases 
and data credibility are further discussed in subsection 3.4.  
This study utilizes data mostly collected from SDC Platinum’s VentureXpert (former 
Thomson Venture Economics) private equity database, which is a commercial dataset 
provided by Thomson Reuters. Another data source used in this study is a commercially 
available private equity database provided by EurekaHedge. 
                                                          
1 TVPI (Total value to paid in capital) = (Sum of all distributions + latest NAV) / Sum of takedowns 
2 DPI (Distributed to paid in) = Sum of all distributions / Sum of takedowns 
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Kaplan et al. (2014) studied the differences among different commercially available 
databases with heterogeneous results regarding performance reporting. They replicated the 
seminal private equity performance study by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) not by using the 
original Thomson Venture Economics database, but using a less biased commercial database 
by Burgiss and concluded that the performance data provided by Venture Economics suffers 
from a clear underperformance bias. Kaplan et al. (2014) argue that the PE database by 
Burgiss offers the most objective data regarding private equity performance as all the 
Burgiss data is collected directly from investors, which results in minimal potential bias. 
However, the relative performance is not of primary importance in this study as I focus on 
the differences in returns between funds rather than relative performance to public market 
equivalent investments. Therefore, VentureXpert private equity database fits well for this 
study due to its comprehensive data on fund attributes, portfolio companies and 
performance measures.   
 
3.1. Fund level exit data 
To investigate whether a higher fund sequence number affects fund managers’ abilities to 
successfully liquidate the fund, it is essential, for this study, to have access to fund level data 
on vintage, size, sequence number, raising status and most importantly on portfolio 
companies and their status. The private equity data in VentureXpert covers investment data 
only until end of 2012 thus excluding most recent funds from this data. However, a more 
recent dataset is used to investigate the fund level performance later in this study. To account 
for the typical long investment horizon of PE funds, which affects the exit rate of portfolio 
companies, only liquidated funds raised between 1980 and 2001 are considered. To control 
for geographical differences on fund performance, only funds of the US based general 
partners are considered. Funds with less than $3 million committed capital are excluded to 
focus on economically meaningful funds. With these restrictions, VentureXpert returned the 
fund level information on 2238 different PE funds with all the information requested.  
Of these 2238 individual funds, VC funds dominate the sample with approximately 73% of 
observations (see Table I, p.9). Intuitively, majority stakes acquiring buyout funds outsize 
VC funds averaging $328.9 and $75.3 million, respectively. However, this difference in sizes 
is largely driven by a few larger buyout funds as differences in median sizes are substantially 
smaller. There are no significant differences between buyout and VC funds regarding 
average sequence numbers of 3.16 and 3.33, respectively. Buyout and VC funds differ 
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considerably when examining the number of portfolio companies. Buyout funds acquire 
majority stakes in essentially fewer number of companies whereas VC investments tend to 
be far more diversified. An average buyout fund invests in just 8.31 portfolio companies 
whereas the same number for venture capital funds sets to 17.72.  
SDC Platinum’s VentureXpert data also allows to explore each funds’ investments at the 
portfolio company level. For each portfolio company, VentureXpert data states in detail 
whether the portfolio company has been successfully exited through an IPO or by an M&A, 
or whether the company has gone bankrupt or is still active in the portfolio. By combining 
this data, the successful exit rate can be calculated for further investigation.  
 
Table I 
Descriptive Statistics, VentureXpert 
The full sample of SDC Platinum VentureXpert US based funds with vintage 1980-2001. Funds with size under 
$3 million are excluded. Fund sizes are reported in million US dollars. Sequence numbers refer to the 
subsequent funds raised by a given GP. Portfolio companies refer to the number of companies each fund has 
invested in. Observations refers to the number of individual funds. 
 Sample Buyout Funds VC Funds All Funds 
     
Average size 328.9 75.3 142.8 
Median size 144.0 37.1 50.0 
Minimum size 3.4 3.0 3.0 
Maximum size 6,011.6 1,775.0 6,011.6 
Average sequence number 3.16 3.33 3.29 
Median sequence number 2 2 2 
Average number of portfolio companies 8.31 17.72 15.21 
Median number of portfolio companies 5 13 10 
Portfolio companies total 4,955 29,090 34,045 
Observations 596 1,642 2,238 
 
 
3.2. Aggregate performance data 
SDC VentureXpert does not allow to observe fund level cash flows directly, but it reports 
aggregate level cash flows which can be further defined by certain fund attributes. To obtain 
a meaningful dataset of aggregate fund cash flows, I limit the search to cover fund vintages 
from 1980 to 2001 with an US marketplace. To assort fund cash flow data to match given 
sequence number, I run the search individually for fund sequences 1-9 and 10+. I conduct 
the search for both VC funds and buyout & mezzanine funds for further investigation of 
possible differences. VentureXpert returned cash flow data including aggregate takedowns, 
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cash distribution, stock distribution and latest NAV3 for 1631 funds in total. Of the total 
sample of 1631 funds, 1068 were classified as VC funds and rest 563 were buyout & 
mezzanine funds.  
 
3.3. Fund level performance data 
As an alternative source of data for PE fund performances I utilize a smaller but a more 
complete dataset collected from a commercial financial data provider EurekaHedge. The 
total fund sample contains detailed performance data about 110 buyout funds and 65 VC 
funds (see Table II). A clear advantage of the data compared to VentureXpert is that 
EurekaHedge reports individually fund level performance measures (TVPI, DPI, RVPI & 
IRR) and contains data on most recent funds as well. Similarly to VentureXpert data, only 
liquidated funds are included in the analysis. As EurekaHedge provides financial data up to 
this date, vintages until 2004 are included.  
Table II 
Descriptive Statistics, EurekaHedge 
Full sample of EurekaHedge database US based funds with vintage 1981-2004 and with all the information 
needed available. Fund sizes are reported in million US dollars. Sequence numbers refer to the subsequent 
funds raised by a given GP. Observations refers to the number of individual funds. 
Sample Buyout Funds VC Funds All Funds 
Average size 1,588.1 457.0 1,168.0 
Median size 1,025 265 640 
Minimum size 81 20 20 
Maximum size 6,130 2,200 6,130 
Average sequence number 5.91 6.83 6.25 
Median sequence number 4 7 5 
Observations 110 65 175 
 
As observable from Table II, EurekaHedge database contains data with a focus on more 
recent funds. Average sequence numbers and fund sizes differ considerably from those of 
VentureXpert, being substantially larger. This difference is likely to be driven by the fact that 
the average (median) vintage year of this dataset is 1998 (1999) whereas the fund vintages 
in VentureXpert data set to 1992 (1993). Due to a strong correlation between fund sequence 
                                                          
3 NAV = Net Asset Value 
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number and fund size, also fund commitments are substantially larger in the EurekaHedge 
dataset.  
 
3.4. Restrictions in data and possible biases 
Objective evaluation of private equity funds is difficult for various reasons. Commercially 
available databases differ in their reporting methods, data sources and in data availability. 
Fund managers have an incentive to highlight returns of their successful funds, which helps 
them in raising subsequent funds (Barber and Yasuda, 2017). Conversely, underperforming 
fund managers have an incentive to not to report their performances to commercially 
available databases. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) study whether selective reporting could 
create an upward bias to the Thomson Venture Economics (current VentureXpert) data. 
They find no evidence to support the hypothesis that fund managers would stop reporting 
performance measures in case that a given fund’s performance declines, but they conclude 
that the general partners of successful funds are more likely to report performance of the 
subsequent funds than the general partners of underperforming funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 
2005).  
The most restrictive element in the EurekaHedge fund level performance data is the number 
of observations. This limits the credibility of findings as the statistical significance weakens. 
However, being able to address the performance measures at the fund level makes it possible 
to investigate the relationship between the fund sequence number and fund performance 
more thoroughly than with just the aggregate performance data. EurekaHedge (2017) also 
reports that their data is sourced from both general partners and limited partners, which 
helps to reduce possible data biases.  
For a more accurate investigation of the fund level return performances, it would be 
beneficial to control for market cyclicality in terms of fund returns. This would require data 
that is not currently available with current resources. Using multiples such as PME4, which 
is a widely used performance measure for PE placements in previous research, would allow 
to control for market cyclicality. To control for possible dataset biases and fluctuations this 
study should be duplicated with different data from e.g. Burgiss, Cambridge Associates or 
Preqin. To account for possible risk differences in funds, I would need access to the deal level 
                                                          
4 Public Market Equivalent, market adjusted multiple how private equity placement returns compare to 
public market investments 
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fund data to study the impact of the volatility of investments and divestments on the overall 
performance. 
 
4. Methodology 
This section presents the methods and the assumptions behind the quantitative analysis of 
the thesis. First, I cover the methodology for investigating the relationship of funds’ 
successful exit rate and managerial experience. Second, I go through methods used in 
studying the relationship of aggregate fund returns and fund sequences. The nature of this 
analysis is more of a robustness check due to data limitations. Finally, I address the 
investigation of EurekaHedge fund level return relationship to managerial experience.   
In the first quantitative analysis, I use the fund’s successful exit rate as a proxy for the fund 
performance. This is an intuitive motivation for addressing the fund performance without 
having access to detailed fund level performance, as successfully exiting the portfolio 
companies is the ultimate goal and source of profit of PE funds. Efficient divestment of 
portfolio companies is also a skill that develops along with experience and expertise and, 
therefore, reflects a relevant measure for this study. The successful exit rate has also been 
used in previous studies of PE performance by Hochberg et al. (2007) and Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2009).  
The SDC Platinum’s VentureXpert database returns the data for each portfolio company in 
each fund’s portfolio. To calculate the successful exit rate for each fund, I divide the number 
of portfolio companies that a given fund has exited through an IPO, by an M&A (pending 
Acquisitions are also accounted for) or by an LBO with the total number of companies in a 
given fund’s portfolio. Assuming that the fund sequence serves as a good proxy for the 
general partner’s experience, it is possible to observe the relationship between the GP’s 
experience and the successful exit rate by running a regression with the successful exit rate 
as a dependent variable and the fund sequence as an explanatory variable. To control for 
other fund attributes, I rerun the regression with an extended set of explanatory variables 
accounting for the fund size and the number of portfolio companies. To investigate the 
relative effect of the explanatory variables, I use their logarithmic values. The regression 
model writes as follows: 
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𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖) +  𝛾(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖) +
𝛿(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖              (1)
   
In the second quantitative analysis, I study the aggregate fund cash flow data to calculate 
performance measures for the funds of sequences 1-9 and 10 or greater. Due to data 
limitations, this acts as a robustness check to validate whether a growing fund sequence 
number implies any trends in the performance measures. The sample of funds is very close 
to the sample of the exit rate analysis and, therefore, fits well for the analysis. As the 
aggregate fund data that VentureXpert returns contains data on aggregate takedowns, cash 
distribution, stock distribution and latest the Net Asset Value, it is possible to calculate the 
TVPI (with and without NAV) and DPI which are commonly used performance measures for 
private equity. I calculate separately the TVPI with and without NAV, as Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2009) argue that Net Asset Values that funds report might be overinflated and 
therefore, the TVPI calculated with NAV might be prone to an optimistic bias. In addition to 
the overall averages of the above-mentioned measures, I investigate the correlation between 
the logarithm of fund sequence and performance measures.  
In the third quantitative analysis, I study the relationship between the direct fund level 
performance measures and the fund sequence. Similarly to the successful exit rate analysis, 
I investigate the relationship by running a regression. I run three separate regressions to 
explain the dependent variables TVPI5, DPI and IRR by the logarithms of fund size and 
sequence. I rerun the regressions for the VC and buyout funds, both individually and 
combined, to further investigate and discuss possible differences. The regression models 
write as follows: 
𝑇𝑉𝑃𝐼𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖) +  𝛾(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖) +  𝜀𝑖                                 (2) 
𝐷𝑃𝐼𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖) +  𝛾(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖    (3)  
𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖) +  𝛾(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖) +  𝜀𝑖    (4) 
The results are reported in the same format as in the successful exit rate analysis.  
 
 
                                                          
5 EurekaHedge reports TVPI with NAV included 
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5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Exit data findings 
Table III (see page 15) presents the results for the OLS regression with the successful exit 
rate as a dependent variable and the logarithms of fund sequence, fund size and the number 
of portfolio companies as explanatory variables. The model implies clear differences 
between buyout and venture capital funds. For buyout funds, the coefficient on the 
logarithm of fund sequence (0.008) implies a positive but statistically insignificant effect on 
a given fund’s successful exit rate, indicating that the fund sequence, and therefore 
managerial experience, would not explain well the increase in buyout funds’ successful exit 
rate. However, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the logarithm of fund 
size (0.021) implies a greater effect on how buyout fund managers succeed to exit their 
investments. This finding has multiple interpretations.  
First, it is possible that bigger funds that invest in a greater number of portfolio companies 
and, therefore control for risk by diversifying their investments better, experience a greater 
successful exit rate in average. Second, it is possible that the sizes of the portfolio companies 
explain this result. Investing in smaller companies might result in a riskier portfolio thus 
leading to a lower successful exit rate. Third possible explanation is that fund size reflects 
better the skillset and reputation of a given fund manager. An intuitive motivation for this 
theory is that the general partners with more experience and with better reputation among 
limited partners are able to raise larger funds. This reputation is likely to be driven by past 
performance which, according to previous study by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), correlates 
with the future performance, as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private Equity performance: Can you learn the recipe for success? 
 
15 
 
Table III 
Fund attribute effects on Successful exit rate 
The Dependent variable is the percentage of successful portfolio company exits for a given fund. 
Log(FundSequence) denotes the natural logarithm of fund sequence. Log(FundSize) denotes the natural 
logarithm of total commitments of fund (USD million). Log(PortfolioCompanies) denotes the natural 
logarithm of the number of companies in the fund portfolio. The first value of the explanatory variable refers 
to the regression coefficient. The second value in parenthesis refers to the standard error. The third value refers 
to the t-Stat value. * indicates p<0.10 **indicates p<0.05 ***indicates p<0.01 
Dependent variable: Successful exit rate 
  Buyout Funds VC Funds All Funds 
log(FundSequence) 0.008 0.033 0.025 
  (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) 
  0.53 4.60*** 3.79*** 
log(FundSize) 0.021 0.002 0.012 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) 
  2.24** 0.37 3.12*** 
log(PortfolioCompanies) 0.007 0.010 0.005 
  (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
  0.61 1.94* 1.17 
R² 0.014 0.017 0.014 
Observations 596 1642 2238 
 
As the coefficient on the logarithm of portfolio companies (0.007) is positive but statistically 
insignificant, it is reasonable to question the theory that larger buyout funds would 
outperform because they invest in larger a number of portfolio companies.  
The regression coefficients differ considerably as for venture capital funds. Unlike for buyout 
funds, fund sequence has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (0.033) on the 
successful exit rate of venture capital funds, whereas the impact of the fund size on the 
successful exit rate is nonexistent (0.002). Conversely to the buyout industry, venture 
capital fund managers seem to learn to exit the portfolio investments more efficiently over 
time. In section 5.2., I provide evidence that this translates as improved performance 
measured with other performance measures, as well. There are many potential explanations 
for the difference of these coefficients between buyout and venture capital funds. As the 
portfolio companies of VC funds are likely to be in a very early stage compared to buyout 
funds’ portfolio companies, the impact of fund managers’ expertise to exit success might 
differ between the two investment types. In other words, experienced venture capital fund 
managers might be able to deliver more value in form of developing portfolio companies’ 
businesses and by providing guidance and industry insights. Even though the coefficient on 
the logarithm of portfolio companies (0.010) is not statistically significant at 5% level, it is 
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notably larger for venture capital funds, stressing the importance of a well-diversified 
portfolio.  
To test my second hypothesis, i.e. that a higher fund sequence number results in less volatile 
returns, I investigate the relationship of the sequence number and the standard deviation of 
the successful exit rates. I do not find evidence for any trends implying that the sequence 
number would affect the volatility of successful exit rate between differing sequence 
numbers. I further investigate the relationship between the fund sequence and the fund level 
return volatility in section 5.3. 
 
5.2. Aggregate data implications 
The values in Table IV (see page 17) refer to aggregate performance measures for BO & 
mezzanine and VC funds separately. Due to the restrictions in the data, it is not possible to 
investigate individual data points6, but addressing the performance measures in aggregate 
is made possible. As with the fund level exit data, VC funds form the majority of funds 
compared to buyout funds. As the results in Table IV imply, there is no clear relationship 
between aggregate fund level performance measures and fund sequence. Figures I and II in 
Appendices, however, report an inclining linear trend on Total Value to Paid In, both as for 
BO & mezzanine Funds and VC Funds. For a more thorough investigation of this 
relationship, I will utilize the EurekaHedge data in the section 5.3. to further investigate the 
fund sequences and fund performance measures using fund level data.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Some researchers have been able to access anonymized VentureXpert fund level performance data, see e.g. 
Kaplan et al., 2014 
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Table IV 
Aggregate fund performance measures by fund sequence 
SDC Platinum VentureXpert data on the aggregate fund performance. Seq. denotes the fund sequence number. 
TVPI denotes the Total Value to Paid In which is calculated by the sum of total distribution and latest NAV 
divided by the sum of takedowns. TVPI* denotes the Total Value to Paid In with NAV written off. DPI denotes 
the Distribution to Paid In which is calculated by dividing the sum of cash distributions with the sum of 
takedowns. Obs. refers to the number of funds with each sequence number. 
  BO & Mezzanine Funds   VC Funds   All Funds 
Seq. TVPI TVPI* DPI Obs.   TVPI TVPI* DPI Obs.   TVPI TVPI* DPI Obs. 
1 1.41 1.05 1.00 143   1.72 1.32 0.90 247   1.51 1.14 0.97 390 
2 1.51 1.29 1.21 130   1.36 1.07 0.64 213   1.47 1.23 1.05 343 
3 1.49 1.25 1.21 83   1.33 1.03 0.55 165   1.44 1.18 1.00 248 
4 1.52 1.33 1.29 58   1.73 1.36 0.71 105   1.59 1.34 1.09 163 
5 2.05 1.82 1.80 37   2.21 2.04 1.09 75   2.10 1.88 1.61 112 
6 1.89 1.64 1.52 31   2.17 1.94 0.77 60   1.98 1.74 1.28 91 
7 1.77 1.40 1.40 14   1.99 1.78 1.11 52   1.89 1.60 1.24 66 
8 1.72 1.58 1.54 16   1.54 1.30 0.77 39   1.63 1.43 1.13 55 
9 1.40 1.34 1.33 9   1.75 1.19 0.66 24   1.57 1.26 1.01 33 
10+ 1.58 1.33 1.21 42   1.67 1.25 0.79 88   1.60 1.31 1.09 130 
 
Correlation tables VII and VIII in Appendices also report a positive correlation between the 
logarithm of fund sequence and TVPI for both buyout and VC funds (0.37 and 0.32, 
respectively). This supports the hypothesis that funds with larger sequence number perform 
better. 
  
5.3. Fund level performance data findings 
Table V (see page 18) presents the results for the OLS regression with the fund level TVPI 
and IRR as the dependent variables and the natural logarithms of fund sequence and fund 
size as the explanatory variables. The OLS regression was also run with DPI as a dependent 
variable, but regression results are not reported in the table as they are highly correlated 
(0.99) with the TVPI offering no further insight. 
 The results imply some differences in buyout fund performance drivers compared to the 
calculations conducted with the successful exit rate as a performance proxy. When the fund 
performance is measured by the Total Value to Paid In and Internal Rate of Return, the fund 
sequences have positive regression coefficients (0.204 and 0.037, respectively) that are 
significant at a 10% level. This finding combined with the fact that the fund sequence has 
little or no impact on the successful exit rate, we can argue that even though the general 
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partners do not report higher successful exit rates, they might be able to exit the portfolio 
companies in a more efficient way as they get more experienced. Interestingly, the fund size 
does not seem to explain higher fund performance although it heavily correlates with higher 
successful exit rate. The regression coefficients on the logarithm of fund size are -0.024 with 
the TVPI and 0.002 with the IRR. Neither of these significantly differs from zero.  
 
Table V 
The effects of fund attributes on fund level performance measures 
EurekaHedge fund level performance data. The dependent variables are TVPI (left-hand value) and IRR% 
(right-hand value). Log(FundSequence) denotes the natural logarithm of fund sequence. Log(FundSize) 
denotes the natural logarithm of total capital committed to fund (USD million). The first value of the 
explanatory variable refers to the regression coefficient. The second value in the parenthesis refers to the 
standard error. The third value refers to the t-Stat value. * indicates p<0.10 **indicates p<0.05 ***indicates 
p<0.01 
Dependent variable: TVPI & IRR 
  Buyout Funds   VC Funds   All Funds 
log(FundSequence) 0.204 0.037   0.774 0.180   0.240 0.055 
  (0.115) (0.023)   (0.267) (0.056)   (0.110) (0.022) 
  1.78* 1.61   2.90*** 3.23***   2.19** 2.45** 
log(FundSize) -0.024 0.002   -0.576 -0.098   -0.070 -0.006 
  (0.091) (0.018)   (0.183) (0.038)   (0.074) (0.015) 
  -0.26 0.12   -3.14*** -2.57**   -0.95 -0.40 
R² 0.033 0.032   0.163 0.157   0.027 0.035 
Observations 110 110   65 65   175 175 
 
When investigating VC funds, the absolute values of regression coefficients are considerably 
larger. The model also seems to explain the performance of VC funds better than for buyout 
funds as the higher R squared value suggests. In line with the successful exit rate regression, 
the coefficient on the fund sequence is positive and statistically significant (0.774 and 0.180) 
for venture capital funds. As the regression coefficients on the fund sequences suggest, 
managerial experience seems to be more important for VC fund managers than for buyout 
fund managers. The regression coefficients for VC are considerably higher and suggest 
significant learning effect for the general partners regarding both the ability to successfully 
exit more portfolio companies and to drive more fund returns measured with TVPI, IRR and 
DPI. 
What VC funds gain in the managerial experience, they seem to lose in the fund size. The 
regression coefficients on the fund sizes are negative (-0.576 and -0.098) and statistically 
significant. This implies that large venture capital funds do not seem to perform as well as 
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their smaller competitors. The negative relationship between the fund returns and the fund 
size has also been noted in previous research by Aigner et al. (2008), but they do not disclose 
the results for buyout and VC funds separately. As the regression results in the successful 
exit rate calculations suggested, the fund size has no significant effect on the exit success of 
VC funds unlike for buyout funds. According to the previous study by Metrick and Yasuda 
(2010), VC funds seem to grow at a considerably slower pace than what buyout funds do. 
This is likely to be driven by the fact that VC fund managers often commit to provide 
guidance and industrial expertise to the portfolio companies, which limits heavily the 
scalability of venture capital due to the scarcity of resources (Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 2015).  
Table VI in Appendices reports the fund volatilities categorized by fund sequences. There is 
no observable clear trend among the volatility of fund returns across fund sequences. To 
further investigate the riskiness of the funds, it would be necessary to study the deal level 
data to account for the volatility of each investment and divestment more precisely. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study I have investigated the relationship between private equity fund managers’ 
experience and fund returns. I have used the fund sequence number as a proxy for the 
managerial experience. Moreover, I have investigated how efficiently funds are able to exit 
their portfolio companies in terms of the successful exit rate and other performance 
measures such as the Total Value to Paid In and Internal Rate of Return, which are 
commonly used absolute performance measures when assessing private equity placements.  
The central findings in this study reveal strong evidence for a positive correlation between 
the managers’ experience and higher fund returns, particularly in the venture capital 
universe. For VC funds, a more experienced fund manager seems to be able to exit a larger 
proportion of portfolio companies successfully and deliver more value to investors in terms 
of the TVPI, DPI and IRR compared to an inexperienced manager. This relationship is 
observable in the buyout universe, as well, but on a smaller scale. Experience does not seem 
to affect the successful exit rate of buyout funds’ managers, but it has a positive effect on the 
TVPI, DPI and IRR, although not statistically significantly so. 
According to previous research, (see e.g. Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Metrick and Yasuda, 
2010; Marquez et al., 2015) more experienced general partners seem to be able to raise larger 
funds, but the fund size does not explain larger returns. Conversely, larger funds seem to 
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underperform especially in venture capital. The negative regression coefficient on the fund 
size has a significant effect on performance at 1% level for venture capital. For buyout funds, 
the amount of capital committed to fund does not have a significant impact on fund returns, 
but larger funds seem to be able to exit portfolio companies with a better probability. In 
practice, the findings of this study combined with previous research suggest choosing a more 
experienced general partner with a good historical track record, and choosing a venture 
capital fund with rather less than more capital committed to it. 
For further research and more accurate investigation of the research problems, it would be 
beneficial to rerun the same tests with data from other sources, as well. In addition to the 
SDC Platinum’s VentureXpert database, datasets by Burgiss, Preqin, and Cambridge 
Associates should be included in the study. The obscure nature of private equity data poses 
multiple challenges regarding the data gathering process, which is prone to various biases. 
To form an objective view on the matter, one would need to utilize multiple commercial 
datasets, which was not possible within the scope and timeframe of this study. To bypass the 
need for the experience proxy, duplicating the research with data on fund manager identities 
rather than fund sequences would provide more accurate results with better reliability. More 
precise data, including data about deal level cash flows, would also allow to control for the 
market cyclicality.  
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Appendices 
Figure I 
Aggregate fund performance measures by sequence 
Data collected from the SDC Platinum VentureXpert. Figure plotted from the Table IV. The upper right-hand 
corner equation represents the linear trendline fitted to data. X-axis values denote fund sequences. Y-axis 
values denote TVPI (with and without NAV).  
 
Figure II 
Aggregate fund performance measures by sequence 
Data collected from the SDC Platinum VentureXpert. Figure plotted from the Table IV. The upper right-hand 
corner equation represents the linear trendline fitted to data. X-axis values denote fund sequences. Y-axis 
values denote TVPI (with and without NAV).  
 
1,
7
2
1,
3
6
1,
3
3
1,
7
3
2
,2
1
2
,1
7
1,
9
9
1,
5
4 1
,7
5
1,
6
7
1,
3
2
1,
0
7
1,
0
3
1,
3
6
2
,0
4
1,
9
4
1,
7
8
1,
3
0
1,
19 1,
2
5
y = 0,025x + 1,6107
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 +
VENTURE CAPITAL
TVPI (with NAV) TVPI (without NAV) Linear (TVPI (with NAV))
1,
4
1 1,
5
1
1,
4
9
1,
5
2
2
,0
5
1,
8
9
1,
7
7
1,
7
2
1,
4
0 1
,5
8
1,
0
5
1,
2
9
1,
2
5
1,
3
3
1,
8
2
1,
6
4
1,
4
0 1
,5
8
1,
3
4
1,
3
3
y = 0,0151x + 1,5513
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 +
BUYOUT & MEZZANINE
TVPI (with NAV) TVPI (without NAV) Linear (TVPI (with NAV))
Private Equity performance: Can you learn the recipe for success? 
 
22 
 
 
Table VI 
Fund performance volatility by sequence 
Fund level performance data from the EurekaHedge PE database. TVPI, DPI and IRR% reported standard 
deviations of given performance measure. Reported for each fund sequence number individually. 
All Funds 
Sequence TVPI DPI IRR Observations 
1 0.77 0.79 22.3 % 23 
2 0.89 0.96 16.6 % 19 
3 0.50 0.50 13.6 % 18 
4 1.91 1.94 19.6 % 17 
5 1.14 1.19 18.6 % 18 
6 1.16 1.17 28.1 % 17 
7 1.62 1.62 40.4 % 10 
8 0.47 0.51 16.0 % 11 
9 0.40 0.41 7.7 % 9 
10+ 1.11 1.13 28.4 % 33 
 
 
 
Table VII 
Correlation Table with aggregate fund performance data 
Data collected from the VentureXpert aggregate fund performance dataset, Table IV. Log(FundSequence) 
denotes the natural logarithm of fund sequence. TVPI is calculated with Net Asset Value included. TVPI* is 
calculated with Net Asset Value excluded. DPI is calculated by dividing cash distributions divided with sum of 
takedowns. The upper value of each correlation cell refers to buyout funds, the second value refers to VC funds. 
  Log(FundSequence) Sequence TVPI TVPI* DPI 
Log(FundSequence) 1         
  1         
Sequence 0.952 1       
  0.952 1       
TVPI 0.372 0.210 1     
  0.317 0.251 1     
TVPI* 0.543 0.369 0.917 1   
  0.256 0.139 0.951 1   
DPI 0.544 0.363 0.891 0.982 1 
  0.095 0.100 0.732 0.774 1 
 
 
 
Private Equity performance: Can you learn the recipe for success? 
 
23 
 
References 
Aigner, P., Albrecht, S., Beyschlag, G., Friederich, T., Kalepky, M. and Zagst, R., 2008. 
 What Drives PE? Analyses of Success Factors for Private Equity Funds, 
  Journal of Private Equity, 11, 63-85. 
Barber, B. and Yasuda, A., 2017. Interim fund performance and fundraising in private 
  equity, Journal of Financial Economics, 124, 172-194. 
Braun, R., Jenkinson, T. and Stoff, I., 2017. How persistent is private equity performance?
  Evidence from deal-level data, Journal of Financial Economics, 123, 273-291. 
Buchner, A., Mohamed, A. and Schwienbacher, A., 2016. Does risk explain persistence in
  private equity performance? Journal of Corporate Finance 39, 18-35. 
Eurekahedge.com, 2017. EurekaHedge website [online] Available at:  
   http://www.eurekahedge.com/Products/Private-Equity-Fund-Database 
  [Accessed 28 Oct. 2017] 
Harris, R., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S., 2014. Private Equity Performance: What Do We
  Know? The Journal of Finance, 69, 1851-1882. 
Heberlein, A., 2017. Private Equity Outlook 2017: Signs of Fatigue. [online] Toptal. 
  Available at https://www.toptal.com/finance/private-equity-
 consultants/private-equity-industry [Accessed 20 Oct. 2017] 
Hochberg, Y., Ljungqvist, A. and Lu, Y., 2007. Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital
  Networks and Investment Performance, The Journal of Finance 62, 251-302. 
Hsu, D., 2004, What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation? The Journal of
  Finance 59, 1805-1844.  
Kaplan, S. and Schoar, A., 2005. Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and
  Capital Flows, The Journal of Finance, 60, 1791-1823 
Kaplan, S. and Strömberg, P., 2009. Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, Journal of
  Economic Perspectives, 23, 121-146. 
Korteweg, A. and Sorensen, M., 2017. Skill and luck in private equity performance, Journal
  of Financial Economics, 124, 535-562. 
Private Equity performance: Can you learn the recipe for success? 
 
24 
 
Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Phalippou, L. and Gottschalg, O., 2015. Giants at the Gate: 
  Investment Returns and Diseconomies of Scale in Private Equity, Journal of
  Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 50, 377-411. 
Marquez, R., Nanda, V. and Yavuz, M., 2015. Private Equity Fund Returns and 
  Performance Persistence, Review of Finance, 19, 1783-1823. 
Metrick, A. and Yasuda, A., 2010. The Economics of Private Equity Funds, Review of 
  Financial Studies, 23, 2303-2341. 
Phalippou, L. and Gottschalg, O., 2009. The Performance of Private Equity Funds, The
  Review of Financial Studies, 22, 1474-1776. 
 
 
